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THE ADVOCATE OF PEACE.

ON EARTH PEACE. . . NATION SHALL NOT LIFT UP SWORD AGAINST NATION, NEITHER SHALL THEY LEARN WAR ANY MORE.

NEW SERIES.

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No. 4.

REASONABLENESS OF PEACE MEASURES.

Persons unacquainted with the expedients we propose for the prevention of war, are inclined to look upon the cause of Peace as something quite deficient in common sense, as visionary and impracticable. Nothing could well be farther from the truth. The lack of common sense is far more chargeable on the custom of war. It is a burlesque and libel on common sense, while Peace urges in its stead the adoption of such rational expedients as all men in their coolest moments must commend.

Take our expedient of Arbitration as a preventive of war. The Peace Congress, convened at Paris in 1856 by the leading governments of Europe to terminate the Crimean War, took occasion to recommend, as a general rule, that nations resort in the first instance to some form of reference instead of an appeal to the sword for the settlement of their misunderstandings; and the first Peace Convention in London, thirteen years before, had proposed "the incorporation in every treaty a clause binding the parties to adjust whatever differences may arise between them, not by the sword, but by reference to umpires mutually chosen, and agree to abide by their decision, or to claim, if dissatisfied, only the privilege of renewing or changing the reference." Is there in the custom of war any degree of fairness or goodness comparable to such an expedient as this?

Now, to such a substitute, what objection can be urged? It relinquishes no right. It sacrifices no interest. It would startle few, if any prejudices. It can offend neither the strong nor the moderate peace-man, neither the Quaker nor the warrior. It is adapted to the present state of the world, and consistent alike with the precepts of Christianity, and the dictates of sound policy; a measure level to the comprehension of all, and commending itself to their common sense as simple, feasible, and likely to prove successful.

Nor is the principle new, but as old as human society. It lies at the bottom of every trial in our courts. We often find the wisest and best men preferring it in their own case even to a regular course of law; and we merely ask nations to use the same degree of justice, candor and good sense in adjusting their difficulties, that individuals do in theirs. *Can they not do so? Will they never do so?* If they will, and will weave the principle into the uniform, permanent practice of nations, it must in time put an end to the entire war-system.

THE HIRED ASSASSIN.

Everybody in Massachusetts fifty years old remembers well what was called "the Salem Tragedy" of 1826. Joseph and Francis Knapp, distant relatives of a rich old gentleman in Salem by the name of White, instigated Richard Crowninshield, by the offer of a thousand dollars of the plunder, to kill the old man, and seize his treasures. Crowninshield, entering the house of his victim at midnight, and creeping softly up stairs to the room where he was sleeping, struck him over the head with a bludgeon, and then turning down the clothes, stabbed him several times in the heart with a dagger. Every body called him a hired assassin; and he would have been hung as an atrocious murderer, if he had not in his prison hung himself. The two Knapps were tried, convicted and hung for hiring Crowninshield to assassinate Mr. White.

Here is a clear case of hired assassination; and where-in does it differ from the profession of a soldier? Doubtless there is *some* difference; but in what does it consist, and to what does it amount? How far are the two professions or acts alike?

Let us look at the facts. Here is a nation of ten, twenty or fifty millions, that hire you as one of their soldiers to kill whomsoever they may wish to have killed. The nation, indignant that the Chinese spurn their opium, or that the Afghans reject their favorite ruler, or that the Seminoles will not give up their lands, the inheritance of fifty generations, to some avaricious white men, order you to go and kill them, burn their dwellings, and butcher, without distinction or mercy, thousands of unoffending men, women and children.

We see now the facts in the two cases; and what is the difference? The deed is the same, except that in one case a single man was killed, and in the other thousands, or scores of thousands. The motive, too, is essentially the same — with the employers, self-aggrandizement; with the hired agents, pay. The difference, for there is some, will not redound much to the soldier's credit over the assassin. The soldier hires himself to millions of men called a nation; Crowninshield hired himself to only *two* men. The soldier hires himself out to kill *whomsoever* the nation may wish to have killed at *any* time; the assassin engaged to do a *specified act*, to kill a *single* man at a given time, and that man named beforehand. The soldier is hired to kill by the month or year; the assassin was hired by the job. The

soldier is a day-laborer in the work of blood; the assassin is a jobber at the same trade. The assassin is better paid than the soldier; for the former was promised a thousand dollars for killing one man, while the latter might kill a hundred in a day without getting half a dollar for the whole. The soldier agrees to kill any and all whom the nation may bid; and, if required to shoot his own father or mother, brother or sister, wife or child, he must shoot them, or be shot himself; whereas the assassin, had he refused to kill the old man according to agreement, would not himself have been liable to be hung.

Truly, the soldier makes a fearful bargain. If he refuses to kill any whom the nation may bid him kill, he must himself be put to death, he nevertheless enters into the bloody compact, not knowing but he may be ordered to shoot or stab his own parents, wife or children. Not quite so bad the assassin's bargain. Had Crowninshield engaged to kill at any time any body whom the Knapps might wish to have killed, with the understanding that he should himself be put to death if he ever refused to kill any one they should bid, there would be a pretty close analogy between his case and that of the professed soldier. But the assassin's position was not so terrible. The soldier must kill whomsoever his employers may bid him kill, or the terms of his contract make him liable to be shot or hung himself.

Now, tell us why a hired assassin, like Crowninshield, should be hung as a monster of wickedness, while the soldier, hired by twenty millions to do the *same deed by wholesale*, is admired and eulogized as a hero? To kill *multitudes* at the bidding of millions, is deemed patriotic, glorious, worthy of songs, and eulogies, and monuments; but to kill *one man* at the bidding of another one, is denounced as base, infamous, diabolical, deserving of the gallows, of eternal infamy. Well did Bishop Porteus say,

"One murder makes a villain;
Millions a hero."

HOW WAR-HABITS CHEAPEN LIFE.—In Belgium it seems that the military idea of honor has a remarkable force. Two common soldiers, recently under arrest in the same cell, played cards to pass away the time. One of them lost the few sous he had in his possession, then his clothes, and finally staked his life. He lost. Next morning he was found hanging to a peg in the wall, his companion sleeping serenely on the pallet.

UNION IN PEACE—WHY SOUGHT, AND HOW SECURED.

In such an enterprise as this every one must see the *need of specific, associated efforts*. The object itself is sufficiently distinct; as much so as that of temperance, of missions, or any other benevolent enterprise. It is clearly important enough to justify and require such efforts. It is tributary to the highest interests of mankind, fraught with the weal or the woe of our whole race for time and eternity. It is difficult to conceive an enterprise aiming to prevent more evil, or to secure a greater amount of good; and surely an

object so immensely important may rightly demand the special, associated efforts of good men. In no other way can it ever be accomplished; for the evil will no more cure itself than would slavery, the slave-trade, or intemperance, paganism, or any other evil that has been wrought into the web and woof of a world's habits for ages. A delusion so long cherished, and fortified by so many and so powerful influences, can be dislodged from the general mind only by specific and long-continued efforts. The evil itself is specific; Christianity has provided a specific remedy; and of this remedy, Christians must make a direct, specific application, before they can expect a thorough cure of the war-gangrene festering for so many centuries on the bosom of universal humanity. We need this reform, also, to clear the skirts of Christians themselves from the guilt of war, to exhibit our religion of peace in its original purity, and thus pave the way for the world's speedy conversion; nor can we doubt that the extinction of war through Christendom would operate as life from the dead to the church, and prove the harbinger of her millennial triumphs and glories.

The successful prosecution of this great Christian Reform obviously requires the cordial union of all its friends; nor do we see any reason why they should not unite, since they all alike believe that war ought to be abolished, and differ only in their mode of reaching this conclusion.

A very few assert the unlawfulness of *all* physical force, and deny the right of one man to punish, coerce or even rule another;—positions to which no peace society, however, has ever been committed, which our own has always regarded as foreign from its object, and which most men would deem subversive of all human government and all social order. Others, assuming the strict inviolability of human life, oppose war mainly as a wholesale violation of this simple, comprehensive principle;—a principle adopted by a small portion of the friends of peace, but never recognized as the basis of our cause; a principle involving, of course, the abolition of all death-penalties, and extremely difficult, if not impossible, to be reconciled with the safety or legitimate functions of government. A third class, far outnumbering both the former, discard this principle, yet deem all war contrary to the gospel; while a fourth class, more numerous than all the foregoing, think it right for nations to draw the sword in strict self-defence, that is, when their only alternative is to kill or be killed, yet hold the *custom itself* in deep abhorrence, and sincerely desire its abolition. Now, we wish to unite all these classes of peace men, unless perhaps the first one be too small to be noticed; and we would fain unite them by constructing a platform on which they can all consistently work together for their common purpose, the abolition of war. On this point they perfectly agree; and, since their object is the same, we would let them all labor for it, each in his own way, without making one responsible for the views of another.

Let us see, then, on what terms the friends of other causes have united. They have required, not perfect uniformity of views, but only cordial, active co-operation for